- Author
- Butler, B. W. | Bartlette, R. A. | Bradshaw, L. S. | Cohen, J. D. | Andrews, P. L. | Putnam, T. | Mangan, R. J.
- Title
- Fire Behavior Associated With the 1994 South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain, Colorado.
- Coporate
- Rocky Mountain Research Station, Ogden, UT
- Report
- RMRS-RP-9, September 1998, 87 p.
- Distribution
- AVAILABLE FROM National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. Telephone: 1-800-553-6847 or 703-605-6000; Fax: 703-605-6900. Website: http://www.ntis.gov
- Keywords
- wildland fires | fire behavior | fire spread rate | fire fighting | fire safety | accidents | fire spread | death | fire fatalities | fire fighters | topography | visibility | escape means | smoke | fuels | weather effects
- Identifiers
- Rocky Mountain Research Station (RMRS); fire chronology; mesoscale meteorological model
- Abstract
- Lightning ignited the South Canyon Fire on the afternoon of July 2, 1394. For the next 48 hours, the fire burned downslope in the leaves, twigs, and cured grasses covering the groundsurface. By 1200 on July 4 the fire had burned approtimately 3 acres. It continued to spread downslope through the day on July 5, covering approxlmatefy 50 acres by the end of the day. General fire activity consisted of low intensity downslope spread with intermittent flareups and short duration upslope runs in the fire's interior. The fire remained active through the night covering approximately 127 acres by mortiing on July 6. On July 6 the fire continued to burn downslope through the surface fuels. At approximately 1520 a dry cold front passed over the area. Winds in the bottom of the drainage immediately west of the ignition point were estimated to be from the south (upcanyon) at 30 to 45 miles per hour. About 1555 several upslope fire runs occurred in the grass and conifers on the west-facing slope near the southwest corner of the fire's interior. Shortly after the crown fire runs, witnesses observed fire in the bottom of the drainage, directly west of the ridgetop ignition point. Pushed by the upcanyon winds, the fire in the drainage spread rapidly north. As this fire spread north and east, fuel, slope, and wind conditions combined to result in sustained fire spread through the live green Gambel oak canopy. The fire began burning as a high-inten-sity fast-moving continuous front. We estimate that the fire moved north up the drainage at about 3 feet per second. Steep slopes and strong west winds triggered frequent upslope (eastward) fire runs toward the top of the ridge. These upslope runs spread at 6 to 9 feet per second. A short time later the fire overran and killed 14 firefighters. The South Canyon Fire tragically demonstrates the fire behavior that can occur given the appropriate combination of influencing factors. While fire behavior during the afternoon of July 6,1994, can be characterized as extreme, it was normal and could be expected given the environmental conditions. Similar alignments of fire environment factors and the resulting fire behavior are not uncommon. The uncommon and tragic fact associated with this fire was that 14 firefighters were entrapped and killed by it. This study focuses on two events: the blowup or transition from surface fire to afire burning through the shrub canopy, and the fire behavior in the area identified as the West Flank that resulted in the deaths of 14 firefighters. We identify three major factors that contributed to the blowup on the afternoon of July 6, 1994. The first was the presence of fire in the bottom of a steep narrow canyon. Second, strong upcanyon winds pushing the fire up the canyon and upslope. Third, the fire burning into the green (not previously underburned) Gambel oak canopy.