- Author
- White, D. A. | Rhodes, B. T. | Mack, E. C. | Sheffey, J. L. | Farley, J. P. | Williams, F. W. | Tatem, P. A.
- Title
- Heat and Smoke Management Guidelines and Fire Fighting Doctrine for LPD-17 Well Deck and Vehicle Stowage Areas. Interim 1999-2000.
- Coporate
- Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC Hughes Associates, Inc., Baltimore, MD GEO-Centers, Inc., Fort Washington, MD
- Sponsor
- Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA
- Report
- NRL/MR/6180-01-8558, June 15, 2001, 309 p.
- Keywords
- ships | fire fighting | fire models | computer models | damage control | smoke | scenarios | ventilation | carbon dioxide | smoke transport | storage
- Identifiers
- well deck; vehicle stowage areas; LPD-17; battle damage repair assessment; smoke management; Total Ship Survivability and Battle Damage Repair Assessment (TSS/BDRA)
- Abstract
- The LPD-17 Total Ship Survivability and Battle Damage Repair Assessment (TSS/BDRA), which was performed on the contract design, characterized the primary and secondary damage to the ship given several weapon threat scenarios. The ability of the proposed design to resist damage, recover from the threat scenario, from the threat scenario, and maintain mission capabilities was assessed utilizing the TSS/BDRA framework. The BDRA portion of the evaluation illustrated the need for fire fighting doctrine, which focused on the Well Deck (WD) and vehicle stowage areas (VSAs). There is no general fire fighting doctrine available in the Naval Ships' Technical Manual (NSTM), Chapter 555 "'Surface Ship Fire Fighting" that details doctrine to be used specifically in the WD or the vehicle stowage areas. The effort reported in this document focuses on establishing general fire fighting doctrine specifically for the LPD-17 contract design. It is anticipated that the proposed doctrine would be adopted as ship specific fire fighting doctrine. The TSS/BDRA highlighted several potential problems in the WD and VSAs given a we scenario. Hit related damage often included the release of substantial quantities of Class B fuels (e.g., diesel fuel, JP-5, and MOGAS). Large fires could develop rapidly and be sustained for significant time periods due to the large quantity of oxygen contained in the expansive WD and VSAs. The result was extensive smoke logging of the WD and VSAs, which sharply reduced the visibility throughout these interconnected areas. The potentially large fire sizes would also create high gas temperatures that make fire fighter access, approach, and fire fighting activities difficult. The forced ventilation line-up to this area, which was assumed to remain running for selected hits in the TSS/BDRA effort, supported the continued growth of large fires. The high temperatures and limited visibility prevented expedient access to these areas using standard heat and smoke management doctrine. Also lacking was general fire fighting doctrine for these types of situations.